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Preface 
U.S. farmers-especially Midwest farmers-depend heavily on foreign markets 
as outlets for the products they sell. In 1967, nearly $6.5 billion worth of U.S. 
agricultural products were exported, and Midwest farmers produced nearly half of 
those exports. The entire food and fiber sector of our economy has an important 
stake in the success of public and private efforts to expand world agricultural trade 
and to eliminate trade restrictions that limit access to foreign markets. 
The adage that international trade is a two-way street still is timely. If American 
farmers and businessmen want to increase sales abroad, they must be willing to 
allow foreign producers equally free access to U.S. markets. For more than 30 years, 
the United States has been a world leader in working toward reductions in tariffs, 
import quotas, and other barriers to world trade. We have benefited significantly 
from a relaxation of trade barriers, but American sentiment favoring freer world 
trade has not been universal. New demands now are being made for government 
action to restrict the flow of foreign goods, both agricultural and industrial, into 
the United States. A new mood of protectionism and isolationism, which applies 
to all international affairs of the United States, has appeared on the policy scene. 
Opposition to freer world trade is strong in certain segments of U.S. agriculture 
and industry where foreign imports are considered a threat to the economic well-
being of American producers. Stemming from this belief, pressure for import 
restrictions is understandable. But if new or additional protection is granted, both 
agriculture and industry in the United States may find their foreign markets 
curtailed by retaliatory trade barriers imposed by other nations. Any reversal of 
our longstanding policy in support of freer world trade must be evaluated care-
fully in terms of probable international economic and political repercussions. 
This publication examines arguments for and against a continuation of U.S. 
policies aimed at securing freer world trade. It gives special attention to present 
and proposed restrictions against the entry of foreign goods into U.S. markets and 
the implications of these trade barriers for American agriculture, especia11y for 
Midwest agriculture. 
The preparation of this publication was sponsored by the North Central Public 
Affairs Committee and directed by a special subcommittee on agricultural trade. 
The subcommittee is indebted to the Farm Foundation and to numerous incli-
vicluals for their assistance. Special recognition is clue James P. Houck, associate 
professor in the Department of Agricultural Economics at the University of 
Minnesota, and James G. Kendrick, associate professor in the Department of 
Agricultural Economics at the University of Nebraska, who assumed the responsi-
bilities of authorship. 
North Central Public Affairs 
Subcommittee on Agricultural Trade 
Everett E. Peterson, Chairman 
John 0. Dunbar 
Arley D. Waldo 
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Figure 1. U.S. agricultural exports: commercial and under government 
programs, 1955-67 
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Figure 2. U.S. agricultural imports: competitive (supplementary) and non· 
competitive (complementary), 1955·67 
U.S. Agriculture's Trade Balance: 
About 140 years ago, Lord Macaulay, the 
British statesman, wrote: 
Free trade, one of the greatest bless-
ings which a government can confer 
on a p~ople, is in almost every coun-
try unpopular. 
While people today might disagree about 
the advantages of free trade, the idea is still 
as unpopular. In October 1967, just 3 
months after the closing ceremonies for the 
trade-liberalizing Kennedy Round negotia-
tions, a bundle of new proposals for import 
restrictions on oil, steel, textiles, meat, dairy 
products, and other items was placed before 
the U.S. Senate's Committee on Finance. 
Hearings and debates on these proposals 
have since been held and more are expected. 
The purpose of this report is to explore the 
mood of protectionism that is creeping back 
into the attitudes and policy proposals of 
businessmen, farmers, and their political 
leaders. To explore it, we will compare the 
basic principles of free trade with the argu-
ments in favor of more protection from im-
ports. Vve also will look at the implications 
of this protectionist phenomenon for the 
economic health of U.S. agriculture, es-
pecially in the Midwest. But first, let's look 
briefly at the importance of agricultural 
trade for the nation and the Midwest. 
Nationally and in the Midwest 
Since 1963, commercial dollar sales of 
U.S. farm products abroad have been larger 
than the value of all agricultural imports 
(figures 1 and 2). Moreover, products such 
as bananas, coffee, rubber, and tea, which 
do not compete directly with U.S. farm 
products in the marketplace, now constitute 
over 40 percent of the value of agricultural 
imports. 
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In 1967, each dollar's worth of competitive farm imports (excluding 
bananas, coffee, tea, etc.) was counterbalanced by about $2 worth of commer-
cial exports. Thus, U.S. farmers have a distinctly favorable "commercial 
balance of trade." About 12 cents of each gross farm income dollar comes 
from a cash customer overseas. Yet each dollar's worth of U.S. farm products 
moving into wholesale markets is joined by only 5 cents worth of imported, 
competitive items. 
The total value of U.S. agricultural exports in 1967 was about twice as 
large as the value of all farm marketings in Iowa, the Midwest's premier 
agricultural state. 
Farm Exports and the Balance of Payments 
In 1967, our commercial merchandise exports of all types (agricultural 
and nonagricultural) exceeded all imports by only $19 million. But agricul-
ture's net commercial export balance was $660 million that year, according 
to a recent U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) report. Agriculture's 
net export position more than offset the $641 million net deficit of all 
nonagricultural trade. Were it not for this position, our international balance 
of payments problems would be much worse than they are. So, in the aggre-
gate, U.S. agriculture is definitely an export-oriented industry and a very 
important one in our overall trade picture. 
Agricultural Imports: Competitive and Noncompetitive 
Americans can be proud that most raw-form noncompetitive agricultural 
imports enter our .ports duty-free. These items-bananas, coffee, cocoa, rubber, 
tea, and carpet wool, for example-are supplied mainly by the less-developed 
nations of Latin America, Asia, and Africa. U.S. purchase of these commodi-
ties, which were worth about $1.8 billion in 1967, is vital to the growth and 
development of many such nations. These imports do not compete directly 
for markets with domestic products, but they do compete for a place in the 
budgets of U.S. consumers. 
Some competitive farm imports do vie for markets directly with U.S. 
products. These imported commodities, which were worth about $2.7 billion 
in 1967, are subject to a variety of tariffs, quotas, and other import restrictions. 
Products in this group include sugar, dairy products, meats, and grains. New 
proposals call for tighter import controls on dairy products, meats, and others. 
We will look more closely at these proposed restrictions in a later section. 
The Midwest and Agricultural Trade 
Midwest agriculture is heavily dependent on export sales. Three com-
modities-wheat, soybeans, and feed grains-together comprise more than 
half of total U.S. agricultural dollar sales abroad. All of these commodities 
are produced heavily in the Midwest: Our farmers grow about 55 percent of 
the wheat, 75 percent of the soybeans, and 80 percent of the total feed grains 
exported from this country (figure 3). Anything that retards the export flow 
of these products has a direct impact on the profits and losses of the area's 
farmers and farm-related businesses. Of the nearly $6.5 billion worth of U.S. 
farm exports in 1967, Midwest farmers produced $3.1 billion worth, or about 
48 percent of the total. Nearly $2.4 billion of these Midwest exports were 
commercial sales for dollars-sales that would be subject to any new trade 
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Figure 3. Exports of feed grains, wheat, and soybeans from the Midwest 
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barriers erected by our foreign customers. 
Farm income in the Midwest is more de-
pendent upon export sales than the average 
for the whole nation. 
Of course, Midwest farmers also produce 
some of the same commodities that enter 
the country from abroad and compete for 
domestic markets. For instance, about half 
of our milk output and almost half of 
our domestic beef output come from the 
Midwest. These are two major products for 
which new import controls have been pro-
posed. Imports now represent about 1 per-
cent of our total milk consumption and 
about 7 percent of all beef and veal 
consumption. 
Divergent Views on Trade 
Although making precise measurements 
is difficult, the nation's agriculture as a 
whole and Midwest agriculture in particular 
clearly have much to lose if world trade in 
farm products is reduced by a new wave of 
trade restrictions. Yet there are plausible 
reasons why some would like the interna-
tional flow of certain commodities reduced. 
If each farmer produced and each firm 
handled proportional amounts of each ex-
ported and imported commodity, all would 
be in favor of more trade, since U.S. farm 
exports exceed imports. But specialization 
in production, processing, and handling di-
vides farmers, their leaders, and their politi-
cal representatives into numerous factions. 
It is, for example, hardly surprising that 
producers of feed grains and soybeans favor 
freer in tern a tional trade and fear retaliation 
from abroad if new U.S. import curbs are 
enacted. Yet it is equally reasonable to ex-
pect beef, dairy, and fruit and vegetable 
producers to seek import controls against 
foreign shipments which, they believe, low-
er their prices and narrow their market 
opportunities. 
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The Rivalry: Freer Trade vs. Protectionism 
Through the years, there have been scarcely any public policy issues on 
which all farmers and their spokesmen agreed. Trade policy is no exception. 
Let us look at some of the issues and ideas that divide our agricultural interest 
groups into two rival camps-free traders and protectionists. 
Freer Trade 
The basic idea of free trade is that every individual, area, or nation should 
specialize in what it can produce at the lowest relative cost and then trade 
with everyone else. In this way, everyone will have more goods and services 
than if each tries to produce a little of everything. This concept is logically 
sound and very old. Xenophon, a Greek, wrote in 350 B.C.: 
... inasmuch as many people llave demands to make upon eacll branch 
of industry, one trade alone is enough to support a man. One man, for 
instance, makes slloes for men, another for women. And there arc places 
even wllere one man earns a Jiving by only stitching slloes, another by 
cutting them out. It follows, therefore, as a matter of course, tllat lle 
wllo devotes himself to a very specialized line of work is bound to do it 
in tile best possible manner. 
The Benefits of Specialized Production. Within the United States, we 
have followed Xenophon's advice. We specialize. The Plains States produce 
most of our wheat, California and Florida produce our oranges and grapefruit, 
the Corn Belt produces feed grains and feeds much of our livestock. Each 
specializes in the products which, through a combination of labor, land, and 
markets, can be produced more economically in that region than in others. 
However, specialization fosters a problem. Each area produces much more 
of some products than it can use and produces few, if any, of the other 
products it needs. Obviously, trade between specialized production areas 
must take place. Then each area can obtain a variety of products and pay 
for them with its surplus production. 
These ideas suggest two major principles of trade: (l) Each area should 
specialize in products for which it has low relative costs compared to the other 
things it might produce and (2) Each area should trade with other areas so 
that consumers in all areas can obtain goods produced at the lowest costs. 
One reason why most U.S. citizens enjoy a high standard of living 
materially is that free trade is carried on between the states. In fact, our 
Constitution contains a specific section prohibiting any trade barriers between 
states. A similar provision was written into the Commonwealth Constitution 
of Australia, insuring free trade between that nation's states. 
Trade Between Nations. The argument for free trade between nations is 
the same as that for free trade between areas of a country. By permitting each 
nation to specialize in those items for which it has a relative cost advantage 
and by encouraging trade between nations, the citizens of all nations achieve 
higher standards of living. In fact, any barriers that inhibit the free exchange 
of goods between nations or areas will, in the long run, reduce everyone's 
level of living by raising prices and inhibiting national growth rates. 
Protectionism 
What is protectionism in the economic sense? Broadly speaking, protec-
tionism occurs when, through economic policies, any group of buyers or 
sellers deliberately insulates itself from the full force of competitive pressures. 
Although protectionism and protectionist policies usually are identified with 
a nation's foreign trade activity, any group can be deliberately protected. For 
example, dairy farmers in the eastern United States may be protected from 
midwestern milk competition by arbitrary health or sanitary regulations in 
much the same way as all dairymen are protected from foreign competition 
via our import quotas on cheese, butter, cream, and other dairy products. A 
labor union may protect its members from nonunion competition for available 
jobs by insisting on closed shop contracts with employers. Similarly, all 
workers in a nation may be protected from job-seeking foreign.ers by means 
of tight immigration controls. Consumers in a region or a nation can be 
protected from competition from outside buyers who bid for available supplies 
and thereby force prices up. Export taxes or embargoes (prohibitions) can 
keep prices inside a region or a nation lower than they otherwise would be. 
Most people think of protectionism as national policies and programs that 
reduce the imports of foreign goods below the amount that otherwise would 
enter the domestic market. The result of these actions is to reduce competitive 
pressure on domestic producers of the same or similar items. This is the sense 
in which we wi11 use the term. We should recognize, however, that export 
assistance through subsidies and other means is a form of protectionism in 
favor of exporters. 
The classic method of protection is a tariff, sometimes ca11ed an import 
tax or a duty. It is either a fixed tax per unit imported or a fixed percentage 
of the value of each shipment. 
We have taxed imports from our earliest clays as an independent nation. 
Our· first tariffs were used mainly to raise government funds. As other more 
comprehensive means of raising government revenue were found, the tariff 
system evolved into a mechanism for protecting U.S. farmers and manufac-
turers from the full force of foreign competition. Today, tariffs amount to 
just a little over l percent of a11 U.S. government revenue. 
In recent decades, other nontariff protection tools have been forged. These 
include government-contro11ecl quotas, mixing regulations, packaging and 
labeling requirements, foreign exchange restrictions, and, more recently, 
variable import levies.'' All of these devices have at least one thing in common: 
They make it difficult or even impossible for foreign sellers to compete with 
domestic se11ers in a given national market. Virtua11y all nations, including the 
United States, apply some of these protectionist measures at their borders .. 
Reasons for Protection 
Why does pressure for protection from imports develop? What causes 
farmers, businessmen, and political leaders to call for government-sponsored 
~For definitions of these and other common trade terms, see the glossary on page 26. 
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import protection when the same individuals might oppose other federal 
interference in the marketplace? The major reasons are: 
(l) To protect national security. 
(2) To protect national health. 
(3) To offset "unfair" trade policies of other countries. 
( 4) To protect existing economic policies and programs. 
(5) To protect a struggling new industry. 
(6) To improve the international balance of payments. 
(7) To avoid or diminish painful economic adjustments within an 
industry. 
These categories arc closely interrelated. A protective policy measure advanced 
on one of these grounds may have its real roots in others. But let us consider 
each as if it could be separated. 
Protect National Security. The principles of international trade suggest 
that nations with low production costs for a particular product or industry 
will be exporters and nations with higher costs will be importers. Specializa-
tion will continue as resources flow out of an industry in the relatively 
high-cost nations and into that industry in the rebtively low-cost ones. Trade 
will expand. From the importer's point of view, this tendency toward inter-
national specialization might force a particular domestic industry to shrink 
below levels considered prudent for political and social reasons. 
In times of international distress or actual war, trade usually shrinks or 
stops entirely. If nation A were dependent upon nation B for the weapons of 
war, then A would be particularly vulnerable during time of war, especially 
if B were its enemy. Many nations maintain industries that produce the 
essentials of war-food and weapons-even though the principles of free trade 
dictate otherwise. Maintaming industries that arc not economically efficient 
reduces a nation's level of living. However, if such a nation would cease to 
exist in the event of war, then the citizens of that nation might willingly 
support industrial production that is thought to be essential to national 
defense. The essential industry classification may include certain agricultural 
products, oil, steel, watches, aircrafts, and electronics. 
Many European nations are substantial food importers. Some would be 
even larger food importers if full international specialization in food produc-
tion were followed. But most of these countries cling to some minimum level 
of self-sufficiency, at least partially for national security reasons. Bitter past 
experiences with food shortages caused by trade disruption and the destruc-
tion of war underpin this desire. 
Part of the justification for the current U.S. protection of domestic sugar 
and wool producers hinges on the belief that these commodities are strategic 
for national security. A commodity-by-commodity approach to strategic goods 
is slightly different from an overall national commitment to maintain a 
country's farm industry at some minimal size. However, where the latter 
policy exists, it usually includes commodity-by-commodity trade restrictions. 
If a particular industry is truly essential to national security and survival, 
the argument for raising protective trade barriers is strong. The difficulty 
arises in determining which industries are so essential that their absence 
jeopardizes the nation in wartime even though their protection lowers 
national living standards during peacetime. 
Protect National Health. The free trade of goods between nations may be 
prohibited for health reasons. The United States prohibits the importation 
of fresh or frozen beef from many countries that have a history of foot-and-
mouth disease. Likewise, some nations restrict imports of U.S. frozen poultry, 
fearing infection of their flocks with Newcastle disease. In some countries, 
metropolitan areas do not permit fluid milk to be sold within their jurisdiction 
unless the dairy farms, whether domestic or foreign, have been approved by 
their own inspectors. 
Clearly, governments are wise to regulate trade in products that might be 
injurious to public health. Unfortunately, the health argument sometimes is 13 
used to prevent trade that in reality is threatening the economic health of 
an industry. Such limitations raise prices and protect the incomes of a few 
producers. Trade restraints established for legitimate health reasons should 
be re-examined periodically to determine whether or not the health hazard 
still exists. 
Offset "Unfair" Policies of Others. Most trading nations can use a number 
of measures to restrict imports of competitive goods when they feel that 
exporting nations are dumping excess production into international markets. 
When exporters attempt to dispose of surplus production or capture new 
foreign markets, a favorite technique is to offer the goods at prices lower than 
internal 'levels. Export subsidies and multiple price schemes often are em-
ployed in this effort. The United States operates several such programs. 
Special credit arrangements or related price concessions on other export items 
may be used along with an export subsidy. 
Consumers in importing nations typically favor the purchase of world 
market goods offered at low prices if the price decreases are passed along to 
them. However, producer groups and domestic merchants often are successful 
in obtaining countervailing duties, quotas, and special restrictions to offset 
the "unfair" price advantage of foreign sellers who offer goods at prices below 
production costs or under special sale terms. 
The United States uses a number of such protective measures. We have 
legal provisions to exclude from entry into this country any commodity for 
which an "unfair trade practice" has been established. Countervailing duties 
can be placed upon goods subject to direct or indirect production or export 
subsidy. As amended, the Antidumping Act of 1921 permits additional duties 
to be levied when foreign goods are being sold (or are likely to be sold) at 
"less than fair value." The fuzziness of terms such as unfair trade practice, 
production or export subsidy, and fair value make these regulations difficult 
to apply in any but the most obvious situations. 
Protect Domestic Programs. When a government supports the market 
price of any commodity above world levels, some form of import control 
usually is required to prevent the program from being swamped by goods from 
abroad. This is an especially difficult problem for many western trading 
nations that .provide income support to farmers through high guaranteed 
pnces. 
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When a national program is established to raise market prices above 
equilibrium or world levels, the amount supplied to that national market, 
whether from domestic or foreign sources, normally will exceed the amount 
demanded for consumption. Unless the government operating the program 
has an infinitely large storage capacity or a bottomless treasury, some means 
of controlling supplies offered for sale at the support price must be found. 
The first action usually is taken against imports. By cutting off or reducing 
imports, it may be possible to bring demand and supply into balance at the 
support price without resorting to unpopular production controls on domestic 
producers. But even if some form of internal production adjustment is used, 
import controls still are needed to keep the program from being inundated 
from abroad. When market prices are supported above world levels by 
government action, import controls must be available. 
Both the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United States 
offer good examples of this type of protectionism. Much of the EEC's support 
of farm income is channeled through the price system. (Incidentally, intro-
duction of this type of protection was the only way a mutually-agreeable 
six-nation common farm policy could be forged.) Since the EEC is a large 
net importer of many basic agricultural commodities, highly unpopular 
production controls were not thought necessary. Imports of these basic 
commodities arc controlled by means of a variable import levy system that 
raises prices of imported goods up to the level of supported domestic prices. 
Consequently, most of the adjustment between larger domestic output and 
lower or constant domestic consumption is borne by countries exporting to 
the EEC in the form of smaller markets or slower market growth than other-
wise would exist. 
Since the thirties, our government has supported farm income mainly 
through price supports. These supports have been applied to storable com-
modities such as wheat, feed grains, cotton, and tobacco. These are com-
modities we export and probably would continue to export even at lower 
price levels. So, to prevent supplies from abroad from flowing into the higher-
priced U.S. market, strict import quotas and levies are applied to price-
supported products under authority of Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act, as amended in 1935. The purpose of these qtlotas is not to protect 
domestic producers directly or to raise domestic prices over world levels. It 
is to protect the government's price support programs and to insure that the 
U.S. Treasury does not have to support prices for the whole world. Section 22 
states that imports are not to "render ineffective, tend to render ineffective 
or materially interfere with any program or operation undertaken" under the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act. This provision authorizes the President, after an 
investigation by the U.S. Tariff Commission, to prevent such interference by 
establishing import quotas or levies on affected commodities. 
Protect a New Industry. Trade restrictions sometimes are used to protect 
new industries. For example, suppose that nation A does not produce cotton, 
but buys it from nation B. Cost studies show that if A attempted to produce 
its own cotton, the cost would be higher than B's cotton price. However, 
studies also show that A's cost disadvantage is only a short-term problem. If 
A somehow could begin cotton production, it could in time be just as efficient 
or perhaps more efficient than B. But time and money are required to 
construct efficient irrigation facilities, train producers, procure specialized 
equipment, etc. To enable A to get into cotton production, a tariff might be 
added to the price of cotton imports from B so that producers in A could 
begin to compete in the local market. In reality, the consumers of nation A 
would be forced to pay a subsidy to their cotton producers in the hope that 
someday the new industry would be efficient. Economists call this the infant 
industry argument for protection. 
A concrete problem is that if a fledgling industry has the political power 
to obtain a protective tariff, it often has the political power to prevent its 
removaL When this occurs, the infant never grows up and consumers find 
that their level of living has been permanently reduced to protect incomes in 
the favored industry. 
Improve the Balance of Payments. When a nation's payments to foreign-
ers persistently exceed its earnings from them, the country has balance of 
payments problems. When balance of payments difficulties continue for a 
long time, international confidence in a nation's currency and economic 
strength likely will be undermined. Downward pressures will develop on the 
value of the nation's currency relative to other currencies. 
To avoid such problems, a government may attempt to reduce payments 
to foreigners by restricting the entry of imported goods. If the nation's earn-
ings from exports remain the same, the reduction of imports will tend to 
bring the nation's international payments account into balance. However, 
foreign earnings may not stay the same. They may decrease for two reasons: 
( l) Foreigners will be earning less of the restricting nation's currency from 
imports and hence may buy less, turning instead to other suppliers and (2) 
Foreign governments may retaliate by raising their own trade barriers toward 
products shipped from the restricting nation. Restricting imports is not the 
only way nations attempt to solve balance of payments problems, but it 
usually is one of the first remedies attempted. 
""'~~!!!'~ Avoid Painful Economic Adjustment. A sharp increase in the importation 
--------...:;;;~---- of some item that competes with domestic production often is a signal for 
economic adjustments. If the increased import flow and the resulting __ down-
ward pressure on domestic prices and sales are not caused by deliberate 
temporary dumping by foreign sellers, some domestic producers probably 
will be forced to leave the industry or to accept lower returns. For the people 
involved, this often is a difficult and painful choice. For resources like highly 
specialized buildings and equipment, there may be no choice. 
It is therefore not at all surprising that industry leaders and their repre-
sentatives turn first to governmental control of imports-to protectionism-
when imports threaten traditional domestic markets. Such threats constitute 
the most important reason for the current protectionist sentiment in the 
United States. Although other rationalizations may be stressed, the desire to 
avoid harsh economic adjustments usually lies behind the drive for import 
controls. This desire is especially true of the agricultural sector of many trading 
nations, including the United States. In agriculture, resources historically are 
less mobile than elsewhere in the economy. Moreover, powerful economic 
and technical changes quite apart from foreign competition already are 
forcing massive adjustments within the sector. 
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Simply to accuse adversely-affected groups of selfishness and shortsighted-
ness when they attack competitive imports by proposing higher tariffs and 
tighter quotas is to be naive about the actual processes of competition and 
economic adjustment. Industry jobs lost due to import competition are not 
always similar to those that open up in other industries nor are they necessarily 
located in the same area. Highly specialized machinery, buildings, tools, and 
other facilities may be rooted permanently in the affected industry. They will 
continue to be used even at low returns until they simply wear out or until 
their value in use becomes less than their salvage value. But to protect an 
industry from onerous resource adjustments is to sustain longrun costs and 
consequences elsewhere in the economy. 
The Consequences of Protection 
When a domestic industry or commodity group succeeds in obtaining an 
increase in protection through a tariff increase or a tighter quota, the general 
public in that nation must be prepared to face one or more economic conse-
quences. No matter what the reasons behind the protective action, economic 
effects will be felt within the nation and internationally. 
Internal Effects 
As pressure from competitive imports is reduced, the price of the protected 
product, in most cases, will be higher than it otherwise would be. Further-
more, product prices in industries that use the protected item or similar 
protected resources also will be higher. Some of these may be export industries 
that must compete internationally. In addition, the range of choices available 
to buyers may be narrowed substantially if the imported items have attributes 
.different from those of domestic products. 
Once an industry or commodity group gains even a modest protective 
umbrella, pressures to increase that protection can become virtually irresistible 
as foreign productive efficiency improves. Suppose that an industry initially 
obtains protection with a 5 percent tariff rate. This rate may be sufficient to 
keep the domestic industry well in control of total sales; new resources may 
even flow into production. But then suppose that foreign productivity surges 
ahead dramatically so that even with the 5 percent tariff, imports can be sold 
substantially cheaper than domestic items. The pressure to increase the tariff 
will mount and domestic distress will be keen. The initial tariff protection 
sheltered the resources in that industry from foreign competition. Policy-
makers will have to ask themselves if it is fair to subject these resources to the 
full blast of foreign competition after an earlier policy placed them in a 
protected position. Thus, another consequence of new protection is to increase 
the chances that further protective measures will be required to maintain the 
initial policy objectives. 
Reducing the hardships of increased foreign competition can cost tax 
dollars through programs of worker retraining and tax incentives to stimulate 
capital flows out of the affected sector. But supporting an inefficient industry 
through trade barriers will cost many more consumer dollars in the form of 
higher prices. For the nation as a whole, it may be better to spend funds for 
adjustment assistance than to force buyers to pay higher prices forever. 
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Figure 4. The contracting spiral of world trade (Source: League of Nations, "World Economic Study, 
1932-3," Geneva, 1933, page 8) 
Of course, added protection for a single commodity or small industry 
may not produce a measurable drag on the total economy, but the tendency 
is there nonetheless. By discouraging the flow of existing and new resources 
into more efficient pursuits, protection in a few sectors can slow down overall 
economic growth. And when multiplied by many industries in many sectors, 
the impact can be profound. 
The general public actually subsidizes protected industries. Though 
citizens may be willing to do so for strategic or welfare reasons, they still 
should be aware of it. A simple test of the acceptability of a proposed increase 
in protection would be to ask citizens whether or not they would be willing 
to pay an equivalent subsidy directly to an industry by means of higher taxes. 
The results of such a poll might be enlightening. 
External Consequences 
Perhaps the most dramatic consequence of increasing protection is that 
foreign nations usually retaliate by increasing their tariffs and other trade 
barriers against the products of the protecting nation. One reason that world 
trade volume declined almost 50 percent in the early thirties was that depres-
sion-induced tariff increases in the United States were met by retaliatory tariff 
hikes in other nations. Their hikes led to another round of tariff increases and 
more retaliation. This action and reaction intensified and prolonged the 
worldwide slump in economic activity. The downward spiral in trade almost 
strangled world commerce and contributed to international distrust prior to 
W oriel War II (figure 4). 
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Today, many of our foreign customers, especially those in Western 
Europe, already operate complex nontariff trade restrictions that limit our 
potential export volume. They do it mainly to protect their own farmers from 
international competition. It would take only a modest tightening of these 
restrictions to cut deeply into U.S. farm exports. 
When one nation retaliates against another, the burden of the reprisal 
falls on industries and sectors other than the one that gains the initial 
protection. Unfortunately, the protecting nation cannot select the sectors 
that will take the counterblow: That is left to the discretion of the retaliator. 
But the revenge will fall on export industries that generally are among the 
most efficient in the country. So more jobs may be lost and more resources 
idled from the retaliatory effects than were sustained by the protection. 
Reducing Protection Internationally 
The longrun result of protectionism is to reduce living levels, subsidize 
inefficient industries, and punish the most efficient. For these reasons, trading 
nations have worked toward trade barrier reduction for more than 30 years. 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established 
at the end of World War II with 23 member countries, including the United 
States. Its basic purpose was to assist in the renovation of war-shattered and 
tariff-burdened world commerce by establishing fundamental ground rules 
for international trade policy and negotiation. GATT, which now has about 
70 members, has negotiated a deliberate step-by-step relaxation of many trade 
barriers since 1948. Most of the agreements have been achieved through the 
mutual exchange of offsetting tariff concessions, nation-by-nation and com-
modity-by-commodity. 
The current pattern of trade relationships is by no means perfect, especially 
in agricultural trade. But there is more and freer trade than there would have 
been without GATT. The established pattern is a delicate balance of 
agreement among nations. Unilateral action by a single nation to upset the 
balance by adopting, for example, a new and tighter set of import quotas 
could set off retaliation and counter-retaliation that could unravel much of 
this carefully-woven fabric of liberalized trade. The resulting decline in trade 
volume could easily slow down overall growth rates and lead to reduced 
incomes in many nations, including the United States. We now display a 
small excess of merchandise exports over imports, but we also face a serious 
balance of payments problem. Any narrowing of our current net export 
position will mean added strain on our international financial strength. And, 
as we have seen, these net exports are especially important in the agricultural 
trade sector. 
U.S. Tariff Levels and Agricultural Trade Restrictions 
Until World War II, average tariff levels in the United States rose and 
fell as the political power of protectionist factions here and abroad waxed 
and waned. Tariff peaks were reached in 1830, 1865, and 1933. The Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 led to the most recent high water mark in U.S. 
tariffs, but tariff levels throughout the world have drifted downward since 
the thirties. The turning point was the passage of the U.S. Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act of 1934. This measure gave the President authority to 
negotiate tariff concessions on imports in return for equivalent concessions 
on U.S. exports in foreign markets. The act and its subsequent amendments 
and revisions have permitted us to participate in GATT and other tariff 
negotiations. 
Agricultural trade has not been affected by tariff cuts to the same extent 
as nonagricultural trade. Simple fixed or percentage tariffs are not the key-
stones of agricultural protection for most trading nations. Quotas, other 
quantitative restrictions, export subsidies, and variable import levies are the 
measures widely used. These instruments generally reflect the overall protec- 19 
tion extended to a nation's farmers by their government. Nations attack 
problems of lagging farm income, price and income instability, and excess 
productive capacity with a variety of policy measures, of which import control 
is only one. Agricultural trade restrictions, which have grown up in the past 
30-40 years, are extremely difficult to negotiate internationally, since they are 
the extension of complex domestic agricultural policies. Negotiation of these 
trade impediments implies negotiation of domestic agricultural policies and 
price levels-a difficult and thus far impossible task. Although some efforts 
have been made, almost no real progress has been made on this front in recent 
trade negotiations. 
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and the Kennedy Round 
During the early sixties, supporters of liberalized trade held the spotlight 
as President John F. Kennedy's Trade Expansion Act of 1962 won congres-
sional approval. Among other things, this bill gave the administration 
authority to participate in the sixth major negotiating session of GATT. This 
session, entitled the Kennedy Round, began in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1964. 
At the beginning of the Kennedy Round talks, hopes were high that wide-
ranging agreements on industrial and agricultural protection that would 
stimulate mutually-beneficial expansion in international commerce could be 
reached. 
Our participation in these negotiations was consistent with our long-term 
commitment to freer international trade. To be sure, the U.S. record as a 
liberal trade force is not unblemished; our policies and behavior are not 
always fully consistent. Strong protectionist forces in both our agriculture 
and our industry have managed to blunt the force of international competition 
in some commodities and sectors, and our system of farm price supports for 
many basic commodities has made strict import control of supported items 
unavoidable. Yet, on the whole, the United States must be considered a 
leading supporter of liberal trade among the world's major commercial 
nations. As the Secretary of State recently observed, "For 3 3 years it has been 
the policy of the United States to lower, on the basis of reciprocity, barriers 
to international trade. This policy has served the nation well." 
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After much initial activity, the Kennedy Round talks stalled and remained 
deadlocked for many months because of three closely related factors: ( 1) 
Agreements concerning many industrial products had to be put aside until 
reciprocal or off-setting agreements on farm products could be concluded, 
(2) Agreements on agricultural products could not be reached for some time 
because the EEC had not yet agreed on internal price levels for its own 
six-nation agricultural policy, and (3) Even after the EEC's common agri-
cultural policy was settled, the differences in basic negotiating positions on 
agricultural trade were too wide to bridge. 
With the July 1967 deadline approaching fast, marathon negotiating 
sessions were conducted to salvage whatever agreements were possible, 
given the breach between the major participants' positions on agriculture. 
Broadly speaking, the United States wanted concrete prior agreements on 
market access and import shares within the EEC. The EEC, meanwhile, 
insisted on maintaining its variable import levy system. It proposed extension 
of the levy mechanism to world trade in basic agricultural products. Its view 
was that the "margin of support" given farmers in major trading nations then 
could be measured and negotiated. 
Even though clocks in the negotiating chamber were stopped so that the 
official deadlines would not pass while progress was being made, the agricul-
tural agreements that finally ei11erged were disappointing to many. Some 
lowering of agricultural tariffs was achieved, and a modest international 
grains arrangement was concluded. For U.S. agricultural interests, the Ken-
nedy Round, while not a failure, still did not produce the hoped-for agree-
ments on nontariff trade barriers. 
The Protectionist Mood 
As the Kennedy Round concluded, new stirrings of protectionism were 
being felt throughout the U.S. economy, in the farm and industrial sectors 
as well as in Congress. In the first place, numerous proposals for more import 
control began to surface. They had been submerged in legislative committees 
and elsewhere while the negotiations were in full swing. Second, the apparent 
lack of notable progress in the negotiations had disillusioned many lukewarm 
liberal trade supporters. Third, some unilateral trade restricting moves had 
been made by several foreign nations with whom we trade. Finally, the 
political makeup of Congress had become more conservative since the passage 
of the 1962 act. 
The protectionist mood in parts of the agricultural economy was intensified 
by the 10 percent drop in net farm income during 1967, part of which was 
blamed on import competition. A USDA official recently called this sentiment 
"nco-isolationism." By this, he meant a revival of the view that the United 
States should withdraw from many of its economic and political commitments 
around the world. 
Against this background, the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance held a 
3-day series of hearings in October 1967 on a collection of proposed import 
quota bills. The major proposals included new quota restrictions on oil, steel, 
lead, zinc, and textiles in the industrial sector and meat and dairy products 
in the agricultural sector. 
The Agricultural Quota Proposals 
There are several similar versions of each quota proposal for both meat 
and dairy products. But since the two situations involve different problems, 
let us look at each one briefly. The textile quota proposal is not discusserl, , ....... .,..,..-
although this proposal does affect the farm sector, especially in cotton-
growing areas. 
Meat Imports 
Cattlemen have long argued that much of the instability and periodic 
low prices in their industry are the direct results of lean beef imports, primarily 
from Australia. Imported beef is used mainly in hamburger and processed 
meat products. Import supplies have ranged from 6 to 10 percent of domestic 
beef production since 1960, peaking at 10 percent in 1963. Imports are a 
small portion of total U.S. meat consumption, averaging 5 percent over the 
past 8 years. 
The Meat Import Law. After the large increase in meat imports in 1963, 
a voluntary import control agreement was concluded with our major beef 
suppliers to avoid extreme industry pressure for tight import controls. This 
agreement was superceded by the meat import law of 1964 (Public Law 
88-482). This law does not actually impose direct quotas: It sets an annual 
import target based on domestic production of beef, veal, mutton, and goat. 
The import target is the average annual quantity of these items imported in 
the 1959-63 period increased or decreased by the same percentage as domestic 
production has increased or decreased from the same 5-year period. 
When prospective imports, as estimated by the Secretary of Agriculture, 
equal or exceed 110 percent of the target, quotas that will hold actual im-
ported quantities to the target amount are to be imposed. As of mid-1968, 
imported meat volume had not been large enough to trigger the quota 
apparatus. It has been argued, however, that the very existence of the law has 
induced foreign meat exporters to hold back shipments that otherwise might 
have been made. 
The newly proposed quota measures have three major features that would 
enhance the restrictive character of the law. First, the 5-year period on which 
target quantities are based would be changed to the 1958-62 period. This 
change would drop the large import year of 196 3 and add the small import 
year of 1958. The base import quantity would be sharply reduced (by about 
20 percent), thereby reducing the import target. Second, this smaller annual 
import target would be apportioned into quarterly quotas, unfilled portions 
of which could not be carried over into subsequent quarters. Third, the lO 
percent override provision in the current law would be eliminated. Instead, 
quotas would be triggered whenever prospective imports threatened to go 
above the actual target level rather than when they reached 110 percent of it. 
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Price and Trade Effects. Testifying at the October 1967 hearings, the 
Secretary of Agriculture said that if the most protectionistic features of the 
proposed bills were enacted, domestic cattle prices would increase only 1. 5-3.5 
percent. Most of this modest increase would be for domestic canner and 
cutter beef (slaughter cows and culled dairy cows). Little would be for fed 
beef, because almost all imported beef competes directly with the nonfed, 
lean beef produced in this country. U.S. demand for this type of beef has 
grown rapidly, but the decline in dairy herds has cut into the supply, opening 
up an attractive market for importers. 
Australian officials have hinted that retaliation against U.S. exports can 
be expected if meat quotas are tightened. The retaliation might come in the 
form of withdrawal of concessions negotiated in the Kennedy Round. 
Dairy Imports 
Dairy producers are in trouble throughout the world. Slowly increasing 
demand and rapidly expanding supplies have exerted strong downward 
pressures on dairy prices and incomes. Protective programs in behalf of dairy 
farmers have resulted in dairy surpluses around the globe, so storage programs 
and export subsidy schemes are commonplace. Dairy imports are controlled 
in most countries, including the United States, and no commodity policy 
problem in U.S. agriculture has proved more difficult. 
Dairy Import Quotas. The federal government supports the entire price 
structure of dairy products by supporting the price of manufacturing grade 
milk. When necessary, manufacturing milk prices are supported by govern-
ment purchases of basic manufactured dairy products-butter, nonfat dry 
milk, etc. To prevent international dairy supplies from seeking the supported 
U.S. price, import quotas on rigidly-defined products have been imposed 
under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. As mentioned previous-
ly, these quotas are invoked to protect the federal price support mechanism. 
They worked reasonably well, in terms of their objectives, until the mid-
sixties. However, like cattlemen, dairy producers have long blamed imports 
for at least part of their price and income problem. 
Imports of dairy products into the United States jumped sensationally 
from about 1 percent of nonfluid milk utilization in 1965 to over 4 percent 
in 1966. They threatened to go even higher in 1967. The reasons were: 
1. Prices in the U.S. dairy sector were up in 1966 as domestic milk 
production dropped for the second straight year. The overall support 
rate for manufacturing milk was increased from $3.24 per hundred-
weight (cwt.) in 1965 to $4 per cwt. in 1966. 
2. Dairy surpluses in Europe and elsewhere prompted some foreign gov-
ernments to adopt dairy export subsidy programs. 
3. Technological developments in dairy manufacturing and handling made 
it feasible for importers to formulate and ship products to the United 
States which did not conform precisely to the rigid Section 22 quota 
descriptions, but which did compete directly with quota items. In 
1966-67, much import growth was in the nonquota butterfat-sugar 
mixtures used in ice cream and in several nonquota cheese products. 
In mid-1967, dairy price support purchases began to grow. Upon the 
advice of the Secretary of Agriculture and after an investigation by the Tariff 
Commission, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 3790 under the 
authority of Section 22. This proclamation closed some loopholes in the quota 
structure and fixed the maximum import volume at about 1 billion milk-
equivalent pounds annually. This amount is about 1.5 percent of the current 
annual U.S. nonfluid milk utilization and about one-fourth of the predicted 
1967 imports if action had not been taken. 
Most of the new dairy quota proposals are similar. They require th<:.tt 
blanket import controls on all dairy products be imposed by specific legislation 
rather than through the administration of Section 22. The quotas would 
therefore be permanent: They could be changed only through new legislation 
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Foreigners are not so much concerned that new dairy quotas would be 
more restrictive than current Section 22 controls. They probably would not 
be. But the precedent-setting character of legislative quotas would be danger-
ous from their point of view. Such restrictions would indicate a major change · 
in basic U.S. trade policy, especially if they were enacted jointly with new 
meat quotas and quotas on nonagricultural products. 
. The Price Effects. The price effect on manufacturing milk directly attribut-
able to reducing imports from 1966-67 levels has been estimated as an 
increase of about 5 percent, with no decrease in government purchases. Any 
production response to this price increase certainly will offset part of it. 
Actual market prices also reflect the impact of other factors, but the net 
shortrun price effect of import curtailment is approximately 5 percent. 
In the short run, the price-enhancing effect of snuffing out imports is 
exactly the same as withdrawing an equal amount from domestic production. 
The price increase hinges on reduction of market supplies no matter what 
the source of reduction. In the long run, an important issue is the speed with 
which imports respond to higher U.S. prices if imports are permitted entry 
or the speed with which U.S. production responds to higher prices if imports 
are held down. In either case, increased supplies soon will cancel out some 
of the price rise. 
When manufacturing milk prices are resting on the support level, any 
cutback in imports first will show up as a decrease in government support 
purchases under current policies. Price increases due to stricter import quotas 
will occur only if support purchases are more than offset by a reduction in 
supplies permitted entry. 
Whether or not dairy farmers or livestock producers will be better off 
as a result of import cuts is still an open question. A small price boost may 
delay inevitable adjustments for inefficient operators, but it will not save 
them. And the risks of retaliation for the nation as a whole and for Midwest 
agriculture in particular probably are substantial, though difficult to measure. 
The Quota Package 
Any single quota proposal probably could not achieve broad enough 
political support to insure its enactment. The only direct beneficiaries are 
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those in and closely related to the protected industry. But if, as many advo-
cates of freer trade fear, the protectionist forces join together, a combined 
package of import quotas might well win passage. Such a maneuver has been 
called the "Christmas tree" approach-there's something on it for everyone. 
None of the individual quota proposals would cover more than a small 
fraction of our total import volume. For example, new restrictions on oil 
imports, by far the most important item, would affect only about 8 percent of 
all current U.S. merchandise imports. However, if strung together, these 
quotas would amount to a reversal of the trade and commercial policy our 
country has slowly and painstakingly developed since the Depression and 
World War II. The trading of political support for individually-attractive 
sections of an omnibus quota bill could easily result in a fundamental trade 
policy shift for this country. If U.S. citizens and legislators wish to repudiate 
past and current trade policies, they should be fully aware of what they are 
changing and of the potential consequences. 
The United States has been a strong supporter of GATT from the very 
beginning. One of the basic principles of this international agreement is that 
import quotas are not to be condoned as acceptable trade policy devices except 
in very special situations. Removing existing quotas among trading nations 
has been difficult and not particularly successful up to the present. But an 
endorsement of the quota principle by Congress and a sizable segment of 
U.S. industry and agriculture would place the United States in direct opposi-
tion to the spirit of GATT and could undermine our prestige in future trade 
discussions and negotiations. If legislative import quotas had been in effect 
in the thirties, very few of the relaxations in foreign trade barriers that we 
have negotiated in the past 30 years would have been possible. 
The Policy Alternatives 
One alternative is to permit the enactment of the Christmas tree quota 
package or some part of it. These consequences could be expected: Producers 
of the protected items would be more assured of their domestic markets; 
their incomes would be higher but at the expense of higher consumer prices. 
Our self-sufficiency in these products would be enhanced. Our export in-
dustries, both agricultural and industrial, would have to take their chances 
on the extent and severity of the retaliation undertaken by nations that 
import from us. Foreigners would be earning fewer dollars from their imports 
and could be expected to cut down their purchases from our export industries. 
Some decline or at least a slower growth rate in international trade undoubt-
edly would occur. Our ability to negotiate future concessions on trade barriers 
for our exports surely would be impaired, and our international reputation 
as a supporter of freer trade among all nations would be damaged. 
But suppose we agree that new import quotas are not in the overall 
national interest or in agriculture's interest generally. What policy alternatives 
could be used to deal with the economic pressures that would result from 
increasing foreign competition? 
A first step might be to provide adequate resources for careful investigation 
of import injury claims. Imports often are only incidental to other funda-
mental economic problems afflicting an industry or a sector. When a group 
of producers or manufacturers finds itself in difficult economic straits, the 
first defense usually is to seek relief from competitive imports. Import restric-
tion can be the easiest and quickest means of delaying or avoiding necessary 
resource adjustments. Although current policy provides for such investigation 
by the Tariff Commission under certain circumstances, the results are not 
binding upon the administration or the Congress. Furthermore, the Tariff 
Commission often does not have the time or personnel available for complete 
investigations. 
When investigation shows that a particular industry has been injured by 
imports and that the injury is the result of dumping or distress selling by 
other nations, offsetting tariff measures should be available. Our Antidumping 
Act and similar devices provide for such circumstances. The ambiguity and 25 
lack of clarity built into these measures could be removed so they could be 
applied more quickly, more fairly, and with more precision than they now are. 
When investigation shows that a particular industry has been injured by 
imports and that the increased imports occurred because we lowered previous 
trade barriers, the case for providing adjustment assistance is strong. Adequate 
financial, educational, and other assistance could be made available for re-
source adjustment, retraining, and relocation when affected resources, especial-
ly human resources, are not fully mobile. Such assistance was possible under 
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Its coverage and scope could be improved 
and broadened. 
When investigation shows that an industry or a sector has been injured 
by imports and that the increased imports are the result of shifts in basic 
world demand and supply conditions, the policy choices are difficult. We 
might ask why industries threatened by imports in this situation should have 
access to special treatment that is unavailable to those threatened by internal 
competition, particularly if we retain the fundamental system of economic 
competition. And we might ask why such assistance should be available when 
our total national effort to upgrade our resources, especially our human 
resources, is not nearly sufficient to meet those powerful social and economic 
strains that now menace our society. We can argue also that the basic fiscal 
and monetary policies that provide full employment, encourage investment, 
promote efficiency, and accelerate growth probably could do more to offset 
import competition than a host of protective quotas or other restrictions. 
If we decide to preserve a national commitment to freer trade, we will 
need policies strong enough to withstand the pressures for ever-increasing 
import controls, policies that provide for careful investigation and evaluation 
of protectionist claims, programs that provide economic assistance for adjust-
ment in cases where import activity actually does injure resources that are 
not fully mobile, and policies that keep the total economy active and growing. 
Those who seek protection from import competition should recognize that 
the growth of international trade is in our national interest. It contributes to 
faster economic growth and lower prices both at home and abroad, and it 
results in higher living standards for everyone. Individual claims for special 
restrictions must be balanced against the problems they will cause in other 
sectors of the· economy and in our international economic and political affairs. 
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Brief Glossary of Trade Terms* 
Concession: Agreement by a country or customs union to reduce or 
bind (not increase) a tariff rate. Concessions usually are made on a reciprocal 
basis. 
Dumping: As defined in Article VI, General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), a means "by which products of one country are introduced 
into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the 
products." GATT condemns the practice if it threatens or causes material 
injury to an industry within the importing country or to an industry in a 
third country that regularly sells to the importing country. GATT recognizes 
the right of an importing country to protect itself against injury by imposing 
antidumping duties that are no greater than the amount by which an exporting 
country's domestic price exceeds its export price. 
Exchange Restrictions: Direct governmental control of the demand for 
and supply of foreign exchange. In controlling foreign exchange, governments 
sometimes issue exchange licenses to importers who buy foreign currency for 
particular purposes only, thus enabling the country to control the imports of 
certain goods from exporting countries. Similarly, a country short of foreign 
exchange may utilize multiple exchange rates to limit imports of certain types 
of goods. With such a system, the country sets varying rates of exchange 
between its own currency and foreign currencies, depending on import classes. 
For needed imports of industrial goods, a rate may be set that makes the 
price of such goods in the foreign currency cheap in the currency of the 
importing country. Or the rate for luxuries may be set to raise the price of 
such imports in terms of the importing country's currency. 
Export Subsidy: A government grant made to a private enterprise for the 
purpose of facilitating or expanding exports. GATT requires member coun-
tries to report on all the subsidies they grant. If the interests of any other 
country are prejudiced, the country granting the subsidy may be required to 
discuss the possibility of limiting the subsidization. The rule states that 
countries should avoid subsidies on the export of primary products. When 
they do subsidize such exports, the effect should not be to give them more 
than an equitable share of world trade in the subsidized product. 
Mixing Regulations: Regulations requiring that raw and/or processed 
products sold domestically contain a designated portion of domestically 
produced materials. For example, as of January l, 1966, Australia requires 
that 50 percent Australian leaf be used in all tobacco products manufactured 
in that country. Also, some countries require flour millers to use a certain 
percentage of domestic wheat in the grist. In effect, mixing regulations limit 
the quantity of foreign commodities that can be used in domestically manu-
factured products. 
Quotas: Limitations on the quantity or value of a product that may be 
permitted to enter a country during a specified time period. Quotas are 
classified as nontariff trade barriers. Most countries use quotas of one kind 
or another to control some agricultural imports. 
Retaliation: Action taken by a country because of the withdrawal, sus-
pension, nullification, or impairment of a trade agreement concession by one 
of the parties. The withdrawal or suspension could take the form of increased 
duty rates, establishment of import quotas, or other action aimed at main-
taining reciprocity. 
Tariff: Usually refers to a list or schedule of articles with the duty rate to 
be paid to the government for their importation. The U.S. tariff schedule 
lists hundreds of foreign-produced items on which the United States levies 
duties-automobiles, wine, cameras, farm products, and many others-and 
specifies the duty to be assessed against each item. The word sometimes is 
used in the sense of a duty levied according to the tariff schedule, such as 
"the tariff on wine." It also may be used to mean the law that fixed and 
imposed a schedule of duties. Tariffs may be protective-designed to protect 
domestic production against the economic effects of imported goods-as 
contrasted with revenue-established to bring revenue to the government. 
Variable Import Levy: Used by the European Economic Community 
(EEC), broadly speaking, to make up all or part of the difference between 
the EEC's threshold or gate price and the price of products offered by non-
EEC countries at its frontiers. It is used for grain, rice, pork, poultry, eggs, 
and olive oil. The variable levy sometimes is called an equalization fee or 
equalization tax. It is less frequently referred to as a skimming charge or, 
simply, skimmings. For example, it is said that the EEC, through its variable 
system, skims off the difference between world wheat prices and the relatively 
higher prices in the EEC. 
''These definitions are drawn largely from Terms Used in International Agricultural Trade, 
FAS-M-152 (Revised), Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA, Aprill967. 
